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GENERAL NOTES 
In this brief, appellant Patricia J. Thompson, now known as Patricia J. Bell, uses the 
same terminology as she did in her first brief in this appeal. Hence, Patricia Bell is called 
"Bell" and respondent Ronald L. Thompson is called "Thompson" throughout this brief. 
Any reference to Bell's first brief in this appeal is by means of the "Opening Brief". All 
references to Thompson's brief on appeal are by means of the "Respondent's Brief'. 
Undersigned counsel acknowledges, and apologizes for the error in Section I of his 
argument on pages 8 and 9 of the Opening Brief. The authority relied upon by Bell in that 
section of her brief has been overturned by Losserv. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 
758 (2008). The District Court's decision is now the proper focus of this appeal. 
Reisenauer v. State Dep't of Transportation, 145 Idaho 948, 188 P.3d 890 (2008). 
However, the change of focus mandated by the reversal by the Supreme Court of its long-
standing precedent does not change the substance of Bell's arguments for the reasons 
detailed on pages 14 through 17 of the Opening Brief. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Given the Change of Focus Mandated by Reisenauer v. State Dep't of 
Transportation, supra, Bell restates the issues on appeal as follows: 
I. 
Did the District Court err in concluding that Counts One and Two of plaintiff's motion 
to enforce the Judgment failed to state a claim upon which the court could grant relief? 
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11. 
Did the District Court err in its conclusion that no purpose would be served by 
allowing time for discovery in this case? 
111. 
Did the District Court err in awarding attorney fees to Thompson? 
ARGUMENT 
I. The District Court Erred in Concluding that Counts I and II of Bell's Motion 
to Enforce the Judgment Failed to State a Claim Upon 
Which the Court could Grant Relief. 
When the Supreme Court reviews an order dismissing an action pursuant to Rule 
502(A) of the Idaho Rules of Family Law Procedure, it applies the same standard of review 
that it applies to a motion for summary judgment. Dismissal is appropriate only when the 
pleadings, affidavits and discovery documents before the court indicate that no genuine 
issue of material fact exists and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law. The moving party carries the burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue of 
material fact. Banner Life Ins. Co. v. Mark Wallace Dixson Irrevocable Trust, 14 7 Idaho 
117, 206 P.3d 481 (2009). After viewing all facts and inferences from the record in favor 
of the non-moving party, the court will ask whether a claim for relief has been stated. The 
issue is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether the party is entitled to 
offer evidence to support her claims. Losser v. Bradstreet, supra. 
In Respondent's Brief, Thompson argued: 
"[Bell's] claims in Counts One and Two of her Motion are based upon 
Ronald's [Thompson's] failure to pay the premium for the term life insurance 
policy upon his life after entry of the Judgment, and his failure to [Bell] that 




[Bell] does not allege that [Thompson] took any affirmative acts to thwart her 
payment of the policy in question. She does not allege that she was unable 
to contact the insu ranee company to determine the status of the pol icy .... [ I ]t 
was her sole responsibility to check on the policy status .... 
**** 
In the present case, [Bell] has alleged that she lost the term life insurance 
policy on [Thompson's] life because the policy lapsed after the entry of the 
Judgment for failure to pay a premium that she alone was responsible for. 
**** 
No matter what her discovery found, it would not change the outcome of the 
case because [Thompson] owed no duty to [Bell] after entry of the Judgment 
with respect to the term life insurance policy." 
Respondent's Brief pages 8, 9, 10, 11 and 13. 
This argument ignores the following portions of Bell's motion for relief from judgment 
and for modification of judgment: 
"4. After the entry of the stipulation on July 23, 2013, and before 
the entry of the Decree on August 21, 2013, plaintiff made inquiry of State 
Farm regarding the status of the policy and was told that the annual premium 
on the policy, covering the year running from August of 2013 to August of 
2014, had already been paid. 
5. In June of 2014, when plaintiff made inquiry regarding the 
payment of the next year's premium on the insurance policy, she was told 
that the policy was no longer in effect on account of the non-payment of 
premiums. 
6. After inquiry to defendant, through his attorney, regarding the 
policy, defendant's attorney stated in a letter dated July 15, 2014, that the 
policy had expired on September 26, 2013, and that the premiums had never 
been paid through August of 2014. 
7. If the facts stated by defendant's attorney in the letter of July 
15, 2014, are correct, defendant allowed the insurance policy to lapse 
without providing plaintiff with any notice that the premiums were due, which 
would have allowed her to pay the premium and preserve the value of the 
asset. If the facts stated by the State Farm representative to plaintiff in July 
or August of 2013, are correct, defendant withdrew the payment of the 
premium and then allowed the policy to lapse without providing plaintiff with 
any notice that premiums were due, which would still have allowed her to pay 
the premium and preserve the value of the asset. In either event, defendant 
acted willfully with the intention of depriving plaintiff of the most significant 
financial benefit to which she was entitled pursuant to the terms of the 
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stipulation and the Decree, which constitutes a breach of the covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing that is a part of the stipulation between the 
parties. The breach of that covenant of good faith and fair dealing is a 
breach of the terms of the contract that is the stipulation. The same acts 
may, depending upon the timing of the events, also constitute a breach of 
the fiduciary duty that defendant owed to plaintiff, his spouse." 
R., pp. 86-87. 
These allegations belie the claim on page 8 of Respondent's Brief to the effect that 
Bell's only claims were based upon Thompson's failure to pay the premium for the term life 
insurance policy after entry of the Judgment and his failure to tell Bell that he was not 
paying the premiums. In fact, Bell's allegations went far beyond that by asserting, in 
paragraph 5 of her motion for relief from judgment, R., 87, that the community had paid for 
the insurance through August of 2014. In paragraph 7 of the motion, R., 87, she further 
alleged that Thompson had revoked the payment of the premiums on the policy and then 
allowed it to lapse in 2013, after agreeing that the community asset would be awarded to 
Bell. 
If the premium on the life insurance policy had in fact been paid through August of 
2014, the community interest in the policy did not lapse until that time. Banner Life Ins. Co. 
v. Mark Wallace Dixson Irrevocable Trust, supra. That community asset had been 
awarded to Bell by the terms of the Judgment. R., p.37. Thus, by the authority cited in 
Thompson's own brief, Bell alleged the misappropriation or destruction of a community 
asset that had been awarded to her, with resulting claims for equitable and monetary relief. 
The only uncertainty is when the misappropriation occurred. If it occurred before entry of 
the Judgment, Bell's allegations regarding breach of fiduciary duty and breach of the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing are entirely to the point, because until the entry of 
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the Judgment, the relations between the parties were controlled by the stipulation. And, 
if it occurred after entry of the Judgment, Thompson breached the duty, as stated by the 
District Court, "to stay out of [Bell's] way", R., p.195, by misappropriating or destroying the 
asset that had been assigned to her. 
Whether the misappropriation occurred before or after the entry of Judgment, Bell's 
allegations contradict the claim on page 9 of Respondent's Brief that she had not alleged 
any affirmative action by Thompson thwarting her continued payment of the premiums 
required by the policy. Thus, contrary to the claim on page 11 of Respondent's Brief, Bell 
has alleged that Thompson's actions in revoking the community's payment of the premium 
required through August of 2014 were the cause of the lapse of the policy in September 
of 2013. 
All of these allegations contradict the claim on page 13 of Respondent's Brief that 
discovery would not change the outcome of the case. In fact, that discovery might well 
have substantiated the allegations of paragraphs 4 through 7 of Bell's motion, thus 
establishing the breach of duties owed by Thompson to Bell before and/or after entry of the 
Judgment. 
The District Court erred both in ignoring the substance of these allegations (They 
were, in fact, not even mentioned in his decision. R., pp. 191-206) and in affirming the 
Magistrate's refusal to allow Bell the opportunity to discover the facts that would allow her 
to prove them. The issue on the motion to dismiss was not whether Bell would in fact 
prevail, but whether she had stated a potential claim on which she was entitled to present 
evidence. The analysis set forth in Bell's Opening Brief and in this document demonstrates 
that she crossed that hurdle. 
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The error by the District Court in analyzing Bell's allegations is sufficient, by itself, 
to necessitate the reversal of the award of attorney fees. And, in any event, as stated in 
the Opening Brief, it must be conceded that there was more to Bell's motion than was 
perceived by the District Court. As indicated above, his opinion does not even mention the 
allegations that the community asset had been misappropriated or destroyed by 
Thompson. That "more" precludes the conclusion that the appeal was frivolous. 
SUMMARY 
The decision by the District Court should be reversed in all respects. The case 
should be remanded to that court with directions to remand the action to the Magistrate to 
permit discovery and then to resolve the case on its merits. 
DATED this 2."ftlday of April, 2017. 
STROTHER LAW OFFICE 
~ LL~ Jeff~tfstrother 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the Z.~day of April, 2017, I caused two true and 
correct copies of the foregoing document to be served upon the following individual(s) by 
the method indicated below and addressed as follows: 
Scot M. Ludwig 
Ludwig, Shoufler, Miller, Johnson, LLP 
401 W. Front Street, Suite 401 
Boise, ID 83702 
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